The findings of a study concerned with the locus of power between hotel owners and operators in Australia and New Zealand with hotels operated via a management contract are reported. Hypotheses concerned with the potential of locus of power to be related to capital budgeting procedures are developed and tested. Using questionnaire survey data, support has been provided for the view that greater owner power is associated with: greater owner involvement in the capital budgeting process; greater emphasis on financial analytical tools in capital budgeting; and operators experiencing greater difficulty in securing a release of funds from the Furniture Fixture and Equipment reserve.
Introduction
Hotel management contracts represent a written agreement between an owner and operator where an operator is appointed to operate and manage a hotel in the name of, on behalf of, and for the account of an owner (Guilding, 2003) . Hotels mediated by a management contract would appear to represent a context with considerable scope for a power dynamic between owner and operator to be in evidence, particularly in respect to capital budgeting decision making. This is because not only is the capital budget widely seen to be the most important budget in a hotel (Condon, Blaney, & Harrington, 1996; Lynch, 2002) , but the dynamics of capital budgeting in hotels operating with a management contract is complicated by the fact that a capital outlay decision must traverse the organisational boundary between hotel owner and operator. The hotel operator will tend to be the party that initiates a capital expenditure idea, but it will be the owner that needs to finance any capital outlay (Guilding, 2003 ).
It appears many hotel management companies appreciate the potential for capital expenditure funding challenges, as they tend to clearly spell out capital expenditure escrow fund expectations, the capital expenditure approval process, and remedies available to both operators and owners in case of conflicts. Brand standards and a quiet enjoyment clause are also usually included in management contracts. Owners not only retain control of the capital expenditure escrow account, they usually also retain the fixed assets accounting ledger.
It is notable that hotel owners and operators will not always have high goal congruency. For example they may well be focused on different time horizons, with hotel operators tending to be more short-termist and owners having a longer term perspective (Beals, 1995; Beals & Denton, 2005) . Turner & Guilding (2010b) demonstrate that as most operators are remunerated based on gross revenue and gross operating profit performance, they have an incentive to promote capital expenditure that maximises revenue and operating profit without necessarily giving due regard to the owner's interest of minimising capital employed relative to profit earned. Also, operators have an incentive to support capital expenditure that is consistent with enhancing their brand image (Beals & Denton, 2005; Haast et al., 2006; Schiff, 2006) , which is not necessarily a goal that is consistent with equity value enhancement for the hotel owner (Turner & Guilding, 2010b) .
A further capital budgeting challenge stems from the fact that most management contracts require the owner to establish a furniture, fixture and equipment (FF&E) reserve account (Turner & Guilding, 2010a) . The FF&E reserve is designed to fund periodic replacement of furniture, fixtures, and equipment, but not the replacement of major building components, such as rooves, elevators and chillers (Bader & Lababedi, 2007; Mellen, Nylen, & Pastorino, 2000) . The hotel operator typically administers the FF&E reserve. Deposits may be made either directly from the hotel's cash flow or on a notional (non-cash) basis (Eyster, 1997b; Haast, Dickson, & Braham, 2005) . Release of funds from the FF&E reserve is typically achieved only after owner approval (Eyster, 1997a; Field, 1995; Rushmore, 2002) . Turner & Guilding (2010a) demonstrate how operation of this account has the potential to be a source of significant tension between hotel owners and operators.
The objective of the study reported herein is to develop and test hypotheses concerned with the relationship between the locus of hotel owner/operator power and capital budgeting practice in Australia and New Zealand. Using questionnaire survey data, support has been provided for the view that greater owner power is associated with: greater owner involvement in the capital budgeting process; greater emphasis on financial analytical tools in capital budgeting; and operators experiencing greater difficulty in securing a release of funds from the FF&E reserve. The relative novelty of this study signifies that it may carry significant forerunner qualities. We anticipate that researchers interested in hotel management contracts will find this study to be a valuable platform to build further research, which may stimulate further investment into global hotel markets.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides background information concerning hotel management contracts. The ensuing section then describes the most pertinent literature in connection with power. After this, hypotheses concerned with factors that might be associated with hotel owner/operator power are developed. Subsequent sections address, in turn, the survey research method employed, measurement of key variables, the study's findings and a conclusion that discusses implications arising from the study.
Background
Under a hotel management contract, hotel owners retain legal ownership of the hotel site, building, plant and equipment, furnishings and inventories, while the operator assumes responsibility for managing the hotel's day-to-day business (Guilding, 2003) . It has been claimed that management contracts have proven popular with owners because they can derive benefit from owning a hotel without the need to develop the specialist expertise required to operate it (Horwath & Horwath Ltd, 1988) . The relationship signifies that the owner assumes the full economic risk associated with property ownership, while the operator is only responsible for managing hotel operations (Schlup, 2004) . The intermediary nature of the contract forms an agency relationship between a hotel owner (principal) and operator (agent) (Beals, 1995; Eyster, 1997b; Field, 1995 ). An agency relationship arises when there is a contract whereby one party (the principal) appoints another party (the agent) to perform a service on behalf of the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . One of the problems that can be encountered in an agency relationship is that the agent can be motivated to pursue shortterm goals, whilst the principal desires the achievement of longer-term goals (Lambert, 2001 (Renard & Motley, 2003) . Court cases have led to the following understanding:
Agents owe their principals common-law fiduciary duties -specifically, the duties of loyalty, good faith, fair dealing, full disclosure, and due care. Agents must also eschew certain activities. They are obliged not to compete against their principals, not to engage in self dealing, not to take unauthorized and undisclosed profits, and not to use or appropriate the principal's property (including the owner's confidential information) without authorization to do so. (Renard & Motley, 2003) Inequitable hotel management contracts that fail to provide a balanced distribution of power between owner and operator can result in lengthy and costly owner/operator legal disputes or early termination of the contract (Schlup, 2004) . Like any contract, hotel management contracts require some negotiation and it is only when there is a fair balance between the two contracting parties that both will be able to achieve their business goals over time (Armitstead, 2004) . The outcome of management contract negotiations have an immediate and long-lasting effect on the value of the property, the cash flow likely to accrue to the owner and the performance and manageability of the operator (Goddard & StandishWilkinson, 2002) . Research into hotel management contracting is important as it may provide insights that can lessen the potential for acrimonious relationships being formed (Haast et al., 2005; Mellen et al., 2000) . Such research may also raise the profile of the hotel industry as a viable investment option. Greater understanding of hotel management contracting can lower the risk of investment, thereby enhancing the liquidity, size, and number of investors willing to be involved in the market.
In light of the significance of management contracting in the hotel industry, it is somewhat surprising that there has been a dearth of empirical literature concerned with the distribution of power between hotel owners and operators. It has been observed that in the 1970s, the power balance favoured operators, as a result of their superior industry knowledge and experience (Armitstead, 2004; Beals & Denton, 2005) . By the 1990s owners had secured the upper hand in contract negotiations (Eyster, 1993; Hart & Connor, 1994) . For contracts drawn up in the mid-2000s, there appears to be a relatively equitable balance of power between owners and operators (Beals & Denton, 2005) . Factors affecting the power balance include the degree of competition among operators, with more competition leading to lower operator power (Bader & Lababedi, 2007) ; the relative size of a hotel owner, with larger hotel owners holding more power (Beals & Denton, 2005) ; and the strength of a hotel operator's brand, with stronger brands affording greater power to the operator (Armitstead, 2004; Forgacs, 2003) .
Literature review
Within the social sciences, power has been investigated in a wide variety of contexts (see Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003) . At the organisational level, the study of power branches into three distinct but overlapping areas, which include: (1) the intraorganisational power literature, which investigates power between individuals within the same organisation (see Brass, 2002 for a comprehensive review); (2) the organisational power literature, which studies the power of individuals and groups relative to their relationship with and their dependence on the organisation (see Ocasio, 2002 for a comprehensive review); and (3) the interorganisational power literature, which examines power between organisations (see Mizruchi & Yoo, 2002 for a comprehensive review). The main point of difference between these three power literatures is only that the actors change. The actors may be people (intraorganisational), groups (organisational), or organisations (interorganisational) (Brass, 2002) . The theories of power can be applied across all three different levels of analysis (Brass, 2002) .
In all branches of the organisational power literature, power is viewed as "a change in the belief, attitude, or behavior of [an actor] … which results from the action or presence of another [actor]" (Raven, 1990) . Within this definition, it is important to note that the "intentionality" of power must be addressed (Cartwright, 1965; Fairholm, 1993) . This signifies that the term 'power' should only be used in connection with actions that are carried out intentionally. To include the unintended outcomes of the wielding of power would render the term too broad and would capture every conceivable action (Krause & Kearney, 2006) . Although many authors use the terms 'power' (i.e. actual power) and 'influence' (i.e. the ability to wield power) interchangeably (e.g. Argyle, 1990; Giddens, 1984; Pfeffer, 1992) , it is important to distinguish between the two terms (Barry & Watson, 1996; Krause & Kearney, 2006) . It is notable that some power researchers continue to define power as an ability (e.g. Etzioni, 1968; Fairholm, 1993; Hinkin & Schriesheim, 1989) . Such a definition fails, however, to recognise that power is always a reciprocal interaction between an agent (A) and another party (B) (Emerson, 1962; Etzioni, 1968; Mintzberg, 1983) . Failure to recognise this reciprocal interaction can lead to a failure to appreciate that the power of A not only depends on the available resources of A, but also on the demand for those resources by B, as well as the opportunity of B to obtain those desired resources from another party (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) . In this way, B plays an active role in their relationship with A (Krause & Kearney, 2006) . This aspect of power relations is often referred to as "relationality" (Fairholm, 1993; Hardy & O'Sullivan, 1998) . Power in relations between A and B are typically imbalanced (Friedberg, 1992) due to a mismatch in the distribution of power between the pair. For this reason, it is common to find that conditions of superordination and subordination (dominance and submission) come into play (Krause & Kearney, 2006) . In a situation where A has power over B, and B has power over C, it remains unclear, however, as to whether A can also wield power over C (Friedberg, 1992) . Much of the reason for this stems from a lack of research into multiple-actor situations (Brass, 2002) .
It is evident that the fact that A might have power over B does not necessarily signify that A will wield that power (Emerson, 1962; Etzioni, 1968; Mintzberg, 1983) . This concept is referred to as 'potentiality', which distinguishes between potential power and actualised power (Collins & Raven, 1969; Etzioni, 1968; Raven, 1992) . As Krause and Kearney (2006) explain, potential power is the discrepancy between all the resources of A compared to all the resources of B. On the other hand, actualised power refers to all the resources that A utilises in a specific situation relative to the resources deployed by B. It can be seen that the propensity for A to use its resources to wield power over B is constrained by the costs involved in doing so. Each agent will incur costs to affect the attitude and/or behaviour of the other party to the point where the costs equal the benefits. For this reason, the greater the potential power of A, the greater is the likelihood that they will wield power over B (Kipnis, 1976) and also restrict B's action options (Scholl, 1999) because power corrupts (Kipnis, 1976; Snyder & Kiviniemi, 2001 ). Krause and Kearney (2006) also note that another concept that is important in power relations is the level of "dependency" (Fairholm, 1993; Hardy & O'Sullivan, 1998) . Emerson (1962) explains that: … the dependence of actor A upon actor B is (1) directly proportional to A's motivational investment in goals mediated by B, and (2) inversely proportional to the availability of those goals to A outside the A-B relation. Emerson (1962) sees 'goals' as the "gratifications consciously sought as well as rewards unconsciously obtained through the relationship" . With respect to the "availability of those goals to A outside of the A-B relation", he is referring to the "alternative avenues of goalachievement, most notably other social relations" (Emerson, 1962) . Therefore, the greater that B has a dependency on A, the greater will be A's power over B. Where B seeks to pursue alternative avenues of goal-achievement, however, the costs of such an approach must be included in the assessment of dependency (Emerson, 1962) .
This review has highlighted that there are four attributes that are central to the term power in the organisational power literature: (1) the availability and demand of resources; (2) relationality; (3) dependency; and (4) intentionality.
Hypothesis development

Hotel owner involvement in the capital budgeting process
Where principals are involved in the preparation of capital budgeting proposals they are well positioned to reduce the amount of asymmetric information and decrease the information advantage that agents have over them (Antle, Bogetoft, & Stark, 1999) . Greater involvement in the preparation of capital budgeting proposals allows owners to take a greater part in initiating such investments, which reduces the opportunity for operators to engage in selfserving behaviour in connection with capital budgeting proposal preparation (Gannon & Johnson, 1997; Guilding, 2006) . For example, Turner and Guilding (2010b) highlight how operators may be motivated to seek projects that maximise revenue and operating profit, without giving due regard to pursuing the maximization of an owner's net present value.
Firms controlled by principals typically have a stronger positive relationship between earnings and capital investment than agent-controlled firms (Sunder, 1980) . Where a principal becomes more involved in the preparation of capital budgeting proposals, one would expect the resulting investment to be typically more aligned with their own interests relative to the interests of the agent. Low principal involvement has been shown to result in agent overspending (Marino & Matsusaka, 2005) . This is because principals generally do not have ready access to the costless private information of their manager(s) (Cremer & Khalil, 1992 , 1994 Cremer, Khalil, & Rochet, 1998) . For example, it can be costly for an overseas owner to gain ready access to such information.
In the context of hotel management contracting, "owners are increasingly thinking beyond profit and loss and have become more involved in key decisions" (Bader & Lababedi, 2007) .
Greater owner involvement can be achieved through deployment of an asset manager, who is engaged by the owner in an effort to forge a more productive alignment of interests between the owner and operator (Armitstead, 2004; Feldman, 1995; Geller, 2002; Swing, 2004) . Areas in which owners have gained increased input include budgeting, general manager appointment, major supplier contract approval, and approval of major changes in hotel concept (Schlup, 2004) . Owners have also gained considerable approval rights regarding certain aspects of the operation of their hotel (Rushmore, 2002) . Some of the more important of these include: (1) expenditures for non-capital expenses (generally, those exceeding a specified level); (2) expenditures for capital items (generally, those exceeding a specified level); (3) plans to renovate the hotel; and (4) expenditures not covered in the annual budget (Rushmore, 2002) . It is expected that where a hotel owner has a relatively high level of power in their relationship with an operator, they will draw on this power to achieve greater involvement in the capital budgeting process. Hypothesis 1 has been worded in a manner consistent with this expectation.
H1: Greater owner power is associated with greater owner involvement in the capital budgeting process.
Emphasis on financial analytical tools in capital budgeting
The capital budgeting decision-making process can be informed by both financial and nonfinancial considerations (Moyer, McGuingan, & Kretlow, 2001) . Although there has been a substantial focus within the literature on the use of financial capital budgeting analytical tools such as net present value (NPV), internal rate of return (IRR) and payback (e.g. Graham & Harvey, 2001) , limited research attention has been given to the relative importance of the non-financial perspective in investment appraisal (Chen, 2008) . The literature suggests there has been an increase in the use of financial analytical tools in capital budget decision making (e.g. Graham & Harvey, 2001; Pike, 1996; Ryan & Ryan, 2002) . Finance theory suggests that capital budgeting appraisal based on financial analytical tools will result in optimal investment decisions, provided the firm can estimate financial parameters accurately (Haka, 1987; Myers, 1984) . When a firm is unable to estimate financial parameters accurately, non-financial factors are recommended as an alternative (Carr & Tomkins, 1996; Kaplan, 1986; Shank & Govindarajan, 1993) .
Analysis of a proposed capital expenditure that is based on financial analytical tools is generally considered to be more rigorous and therefore preferable to an analysis based on non-financial information (Chen, 2008) . It follows that a hotel owner would prefer that capital budget decision making be based on financial analytical tools, to the extent possible, and will draw on its potential to exert power in order to impose its wishes in this regard.
Hypothesis 2 has been posited in a manner consistent with this expectation.
H2: Greater owner power is associated with a greater emphasis on financial analytical tools in capital budgeting.
Operator difficulty in securing release of funds from the FF&E reserve
A release of funds from the FF&E reserve is typically achieved only after owner approval (Eyster, 1997a; Field, 1995; Rushmore, 2002) . It is to be expected that an owner with greater power will use this power to make it harder for an operator to access funds held in an FF&E reserve. Hypothesis 3 is worded in a manner consistent with this expectation.
H3: Greater owner power is associated with greater operator difficulty in securing a release of funds from the FF&E reserve.
Research method
Due to proprietary reasons, it would be impossible to conduct a content analysis of a broad cross-section of hotel management contracts. In light of this, a mailed questionnaire survey has been undertaken. A questionnaire was sent to general managers (GMs) in Australian and New Zealand hotels with twenty or more rooms and a minimum star-rating of three. This provided a total sample size of 664, comprising 463 Australian hotels and 201 New Zealand hotels. As no database containing only hotels operating with a management contract could be found, the questionnaire was sent to all hotels in the sampling frame and included a screening question that elicited whether the respondent worked in a hotel that was subject to a management contract.
Three weeks following the initial mailing, a follow-up mailing was sent to the whole sample.
Two weeks after the second mailing, a number of hotel owner representatives familiar to the research team agreed to circulate the questionnaire to GMs with whom they had close contact. This generated a further 51 responses. Two weeks subsequent to the owner representatives' distribution of questionnaires, the sample was contacted by email and encouraged to complete the questionnaire which was provided as an attachment. Finally, two weeks after the email approach, random telephone calls were made to 31 GMs. The objective of these phone calls was threefold: to thank the GM if they had already completed the survey; to ascertain the main reasons for non-participation in the study; and to encourage participation in the study. The survey response pattern is reported in Table 1. INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE Two investigations for non-response bias were undertaken. Non-response reasons provided by the hotels contacted by phone included "completing questionnaires contravenes company policy", "too busy" and "the GM was away on holiday". No factors cited suggested the presence of any systematic non-response bias. Secondly, an investigation for profile differences between the first mailing respondents and the remainder of the respondents was undertaken. Although a Mann-Whitney U Test revealed some differences, the statistical strength of association between the two groups (r value) was small (i.e. r < .2) (see Cohen, 1988) . These investigations suggest the issue of non-response bias does not constitute a strong threat to the validity of the study's findings.
Variable measurement
Hotel owner involvement in the preparation of capital budgeting proposals
An extensive literature search failed to identify any prior studies that have measured the extent of hotel owner involvement in the preparation of capital budgeting proposals. In the context of annualised budgeting, however, Milani's (1975) Milani's (1975) six items of budgetary participation were adapted for use in this study. Two of Milani's (1975) six items were dropped due to questionnaire space considerations and because they were not considered to lend themselves to the capital budgeting context. As part of the adaptation process, it needs to be recognised that Milani's (1975) questionnaire instrument was designed to be administered to subordinates to measure the degree to which they participate in the budget setting process.
Within the current study, however, GMs are being asked to comment about their hotel owner's participation in the preparation of capital budgeting proposals. For this reason, questions in the current study were framed in a directionally opposite manner to those posed by Milani (1975) . Table 2 provides an overview of the Milani items and how they have been adapted for use in the current study. Column one indicates the questionnaire item number.
Column two outlines the six questions posed by Milani (1975) . Column three shows the current study's adaptations of Milani's (1975) questions. The fourth column describes the seven point Likert type scale adopted for each question.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
An assessment of the suitability of applying factor analysis to the data collected via the four items was undertaken. All items were statistically significantly correlated (p < .05). Kaiser Meyer Olkin and Bartlett's Test indicated favourable sampling adequacy. Communalities were greater than the recommended .5 threshold, except for item 2 at .149. Consistent with Hair et al. (2006) , the decision was taken to remove item 2 from the factor analysis. After doing this, a one factor solution with an Eigenvalue greater than 1 was extracted, which explained 59.64% of the variance. All item loadings were above the recommended .55 threshold and were statistically significant (p < .05). Hotel owner involvement in the capital budgeting process has been measured by calculating the mean of items 1, 3 and 4. The consolidated item yielded an acceptable Cronbach Alpha of .653.
Emphasis on financial analytical tools in capital budgeting
Butler, Davis, Pike, and Sharp (1993) see three distinct orientations in non-financial approaches to investment appraisal: (1) strategically-oriented investment appraisal, which is evident when high importance is attached to a project's capacity to deliver competitive advantage (Lefley, 2004) ; (2) politically-oriented investment appraisal, which is evident when an organisation has highly self-interested individuals who employ guile and strategies such as coalition building to enhance the likelihood of their preferred project proposal being sanctioned by senior management (Hickson, Butler, Cray, Mallory, & Wilson, 1986) , and (3) intuition-based investment appraisal, which is evident when high importance is attached to the exercise of senior management's intuition and judgment (Chami & Fullenkamp, 2002) .
Drawing on this categorisation, three questions were developed relating to each of these nonfinancial investment appraisal orientations. In addition, three questions were developed to gauge the extent to which financial considerations influence whether a capital expenditure proposal is supported. Table 3 adequacy. The factor analysis generated three factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 (3.830, 2.608 and 1.128). The relative association of the items with these three factors is evident from Table 4 , which presents principal component analysis findings. The thematic origin of each of the items is provided in the table's second column. While this initially suggested a three factor result, inspection of the eigenvalue scree plot revealed a significant break in the curve occurring at the locus of the third highest eigenvalue (the fourth and fifth highest eigenvalues were .888 and .798, respectively). Accordingly, and consistent with Hair et al's (2006) recommendations, it appeared most appropriate to consider two strong underlying factors:
1. Non-financial emphasis (items I2, P2, P3, P1, I1, I3); and 2. Financial emphasis (items F2, F3, F1).
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
The three items associated with financial emphasis (the second factor in Table 4) with a standard deviation of 1.44 (n = 99).
Operator difficulty in securing release of funds from the FF&E reserve
Three items were employed to measure difficulty in securing a release of funds from the FF&E reserve. The first question asked respondents to indicate their affirmation with the statement: "In my hotel it can be hard to get the owner to release funds from the FF&E reserve" on a Likert scale ranging from '1' ('strongly disagree') to '7' ('strongly agree') (mean 3.33, std. dev. 1.85). The second question asked: "How often does your hotel owner refuse to release funds from the FF&E reserve?", with responses provided on a Likert scale ranging from '1' ('never') to '7' ('frequently') (mean 2.72, std. dev. 1.51). The final question asked "How much do you have to pressurise your hotel owner in order to get funds released from the FF&E reserve?" with responses recorded on a Likert scale ranging from '1' (not at all) to '7' (very much) (mean 3.17, std. dev.1.83). A correlation analysis revealed statistically significant positive associations between all three items (p < .01). A factor analysis revealed all items having a communality greater than .8 with a single factor solution explaining 83.02% of the variance. In light of this, difficulty in securing a release of funds from the FF&E reserve account has been measured by calculating the mean of the three items. The three items yielded a strong Cronbach Alpha of .895. The consolidated item developed had a mean of 3.07 with a standard deviation of 1.58 (n = 88).
Locus of power between hotel owner and operator
Given that two distinct organisations are involved in a hotel management contract, the owner and the operator, it appeared appropriate to guide the current study's operationalisation of a power measure by the inter-organisational power literature. Inter-organisational power survey research is usually framed according to two common power perspectives: (1) an assessment of the alternative choices available to both organisations in the negotiation phase; and (2) the strategic importance of the relationship to the organisations at the time of contract negotiation. Difficulties arise when attempting to apply these conceptualisations of power to the context of the current study. These relate to the fact that the best placed party to comment on the locus of power between hotel owner and operator is the hotel GM. There is a low likelihood, however, that a GM responding to the survey questionnaire would be in a position to comment on the conditions existing at the time that the hotel management contract was negotiated. This is because of GMs' notoriously high job mobility (Akrivos, Ladkin, & Reklitis, 2007) and also that hotel management contracts are typically entered into for ten or more years (Haast et al., 2005) . Despite these concerns, the hotel GM would appear to be in a very strong position to provide a well-informed perspective on the locus of power between owner and operator. This is because while the operator employs the GM, the GM's appointment typically requires approval of the owner, and it is the owner that funds the GM's salary (Guilding, 2003) . Guilding (2006) comments: … the general manager … can be seen to be well placed to observe any 'cross-fire' between a hotel owner and operator. [GMs are strategically placed] … with respect to mediating the relationship between hotel owner and operator.
Based on the view that a GM is motivated to maintain a strong working relationship with both the owner and operator, it is argued that for the purpose of gauging power in the current study, a GM's relationship with both the owner and the operator can be viewed as being similar to a 'within organisation' relationship. This is because a hotel owner and operator are in an enduring organisational relationship. In light of this, the well-established intraorganisational power literature can be drawn upon to inform the development of a measure of the locus of power between hotel owners and operators.
Within the intra-organisational power literature, Krause and Kearney (2006) explain that much empirical questionnaire survey based research has been conducted within a broad range of organisational contexts and that a classical five power base typology developed by French and Raven (1959) has been used. This typology comprises: (1) reward power; (2) coercive power; (3) legitimate power; (4) referent power; and (5) expert knowledge power. French and Raven (1960) describe their five bases of power in which a power-wielder, O, can exert influence over a person, P, as follows: Reward power is based on P's perception that O has the ability to grant rewards for him/her in exchange for compliance. For example, O might provide a monetary incentive to P in exchange for P completing a task that is not part of their job description. Coercive power is based on P's perception that O has the ability to mediate punishments to P in exchange for compliance. For example, O may threaten P with termination should they not comply with a certain request. Legitimate power is based on P's perception that O has a legitimate right to prescribe behaviour for P. Legitimate power stems from O having a justifiable right to request compliance from P. For instance, P may comply with a request from O simply because O has a right to ask P to do their work in a certain way.
Referent power is based on P's identification with O. Referent power is derived from P's desire to please O because they are highly attracted to O and desire to become closely associated with O. Referent power is therefore in evidence when P complies with the request of O due to P's identification with O. For instance, P wishing to move up the organizational hierarchy will likely comply with requests made by O due to P wanting to be in a similar position to O in the future. Expert power is based on P's perception that O has some special knowledge or expertness. Expert power is at use when O relies on their superior knowledge in order to gain compliance from P. For example, P may follow the advice of O because O is perceived as possessing a high-level expertise in their field.
Within the current study, it was determined that the locus of power between hotel owner and operator could be most effectively elucidated by determining which of the two contracting parties exerted the greatest influence over the GM. Following a review of the intraorganisational power literature, Krause and Kearney (2006) recommend that: (1) power bases be measured through the use of multi-item measurement; (2) that responses be rated rather than ranked; and (3) that future studies measure the wielding of power in its dependency on the particularities of the situation (i.e. context specific). Krause and Kearney's (2006) recommendations have been heeded in developing the current study's power measure. This resulted in three separate context specific questions being posed for each of French and Raven's (1959) five power bases, using a seven-point Likert-type measurement scale. The following statement was presented in the questionnaire immediately prior to the 15 items: "In terms of your hotel owner and your hotel operating company, which entity is in a stronger position to:" Column four of Table 5 presents the 15 items posed together with an identifying code for each item. The Table' s first three columns capture the origin of each item and the final column provides each item's mean and standard deviation.
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
An assessment of the suitability of applying factor analysis to the data collected via the 15 items was undertaken. Consistent with the view that power is a multidimensional variable (French & Raven, 1960) , an independent factor analysis was conducted for each of the three sets of items comprising the five dimensions of power. In all cases, correlations between the three items were highly statistically significant (p < .01). Kaiser Meyer Olkin and Bartlett's Test indicated favourable sampling adequacy. Communalities were greater than the recommended .5 threshold in all but one case (item L1 at .382). Hair et al. (2006) indicate that items yielding communalities below .5 can be ignored. As the L1 item derives from a measure that has been used in prior studies, it was deemed preferable to retain the item within the factor solution. For each of the five dimensions of power, a single factor solution with an Eigenvalue greater than 1 was extracted, with a variance explained greater than the 60% recommended threshold (Hair et al., 2006) . All item loadings were above the recommended .55 threshold and were statistically significant (p < .05). These findings support the measurement of the five dimensions of power by calculating the mean of the three underlying items for each of the five item groupings. The degree of association between the five dimensions of power was examined using correlation analysis. All items were found to be highly statistically significantly correlated at p < .01.
Hotel size
With respect to hotel size, it could be argued that larger owners will tend to own larger hotels. This would suggest that owner power is greater in larger hotels. On the other hand, however, it is in large hotels where we tend to find large international hotel management companies (e.g. Hilton, Hyatt, Marriott, etc). This factor suggests that power in large hotels could well rest with the operator. The potential significance of hotel size has resulted in it being included as a control variable in the analyses undertaken. Although there are other possibilities, such as acres of land, number of employees, annual sales turnover or net profits (Vallen & Vallen, 2005) , the number of rooms in a hotel is the most commonly accepted measure of a hotel's size (Garcia-Falcon & Medina-Munoz, 1999; Vallen & Vallen, 2005) . To determine the number of rooms in a hotel, questionnaire measures are typically categorical (e.g. Kasavana & Brooks, 1995; Vallen & Vallen, 2005) or discrete (e.g. Guilding & Lamminmaki, 2007) . In light of the advantages of discrete data, respondents were asked to indicate the number of rooms in their hotel.
Hotel owner size
Hotel owner size has been included in the study as a control variable. As noted earlier, a factor affecting the power balance is the relative size of a hotel owner, with larger hotel owners tending to hold more power (Beals & Denton, 2005) , ie, large owners have a greater capacity to wield power. In light of the potential importance of owner size in connection with a study focused on power, we felt it prudent to control for hotel owner size in the regression formulations described below. There appears to have been little empirical academic research that has sought to measure hotel owner size. The questionnaire survey asked respondents to indicate the approximate number of hotels that their owner owns worldwide.
Results
Table 6 presents a correlation matrix that includes all of the variables contained within the formulated regression models. Ideally, all independent variables should be statistically significantly correlated with the dependent variable (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010) .
As one or more of the five bases of power (independent variables) are significantly correlated with each of the dependent variables, the statistical tests conducted appear warranted. For each of the regression models formulated, all variable inflation factors (see Tables 7, 8 and 9) are well below the suggested threshold of 5, which suggests that multicollinearity does not pose a serious threat to the validity of the study's results (Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Neter, 2004 ).
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
Consistent with the view that power is a multidimensional variable (French & Raven, 1960 ), Table 7 presents the results of the five separate multiple regression analyses. In all cases, the models are statistically significant (p < .000). Hypothesis 1 stated that greater owner power is associated with greater owner involvement in the capital budgeting process. In all five regression equations formulated, it has been found that the measure of power is significantly positively associated with hotel owner involvement in the capital budgeting process (p < .01; one-tail), thus providing strong support for hypothesis 1. Table 8 presents the results of the five separate multiple regression analyses. In all cases the model is statistically significant (p < .000). Hypothesis 2 stated that greater owner power is associated with a greater emphasis on financial analytical tools in capital budgeting. In all five regression equations formulated, it has been found that the measure of power is significantly positively associated with greater emphasis on financial analytical tools (p < .01; one-tail), thus providing strong support for hypothesis 2. Table 9 presents the results of the five separate multiple regression analyses. In all cases the model is statistically significant (p < .000). Hypothesis 3 stated that greater owner power is associated with greater operator difficulty in securing a release of funds from the FF&E reserve. Table 9 shows that all five dimensions of power are significantly positively associated with operator difficulty in securing a release of funds from the FF&E reserve (p < .01; one-tail), thus providing strong support for hypothesis 3.
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE
Discussion and conclusions
The broad objective of this study has been to shed light on the importance of power between hotel owners and operators mediated by a management contract. More specifically, the study has developed and tested hypotheses concerned with how the locus of hotel owner/operator power affects capital budgeting practice in Australia and New Zealand.
Support has been provided for the view that greater owner power is associated with greater owner involvement in the capital budgeting process. Observation of this relationship gives reason to anticipate the existence of several problematical hotel management contracting issues. Operators, for example, often complain that if their management fee is contingent upon performance then, "shouldn't they be given the right to manage the hotel free from the owner?" (Goddard & Standish-Wilkinson, 2002) , as owner interference may carry the potential to reduce fee levels earned (Schlup, 2004) . A further concern from an operator's perspective concerns whether greater owner involvement may compromise their capacity to enhance the value of their brand. Schlup (2004) claims that for an operator to maximise the value of its brand, it needs full control over day-to-day operations. This factor underscores the potential for greater owner involvement giving rise to greater acrimony in the owner/operator relationship. Indeed, an owner's engagement of an asset manager has been found to frequently trigger a more hostile relationship between owner and operator (Eyster, 1997a) . Many operators react to the presence of an asset manager by attempting to keep the asset manager at arms-length and not well-informed with respect to senior hotel decision making (Feldman, 1995) . Where acrimony in the hotel owner/operator relationship arises, it is likely to adversely affect a hotel's performance. Further research investigating factors relating to owner involvement in hotels managed via a management contract is to be welcomed. It is notable that in recently negotiated management contracts, there appears to be an increasing incidence of 'non-disturbance' clauses, whereby owners provide an assurance that they will not encumber or prevent the operator from undertaking the job that they have been contracted to perform (Crandell, Dickinson, & Kanter, 2004) .
The finding concerning a significant positive relationship between owner power and an emphasis on financial analytical tools in capital budgeting was supported across all dimensions of power. Rationale for this hypothesis was built on the premise that owners will view a financial analysis as constituting a more rigorous examination of a capital expenditure proposal than a non-financial analysis. Several commentaries have noted that financial emphasis in investment appraisal should be calibrated to the scale, risk and nature of a project under consideration (Burns & Walker, 1997; Hill, 1985; Ross, 1995) . It has been noted that heavy emphasis on financial analytical tools in capital budgeting does not necessarily translate into better firm performance in the market place, however (Baldwin & Clark, 1994; Cooper & Petry, 1994; Johnson, 1994) . Accordingly, owners with high power and a concern to closely monitor the actions and performance of a hotel operator may in fact stifle investment appraisal through excessive use of financial analytical tools. Another factor could also be at play here. A further advantage of an emphasis on financial analytical tools is that it would lay the basis for a post completion audit being conducted. A post-completion audit involves a comparison between pre-investment cash flow estimates and the actual cash flow achievements of a project once it is underway (see Chenhall & Morris, 1993; Gadella, 1986; Pierce & Tsay, 1992) . Motivation for conducting a post completion audit would appear to be heightened in the context of a management contract, as it promotes greater accountability of a hotel operator to a hotel owner.
Hypothesis 3 posited that greater owner power is associated with greater operator difficulty in securing a release of FF&E reserve funds. Support was provided for this hypothesis across all five dimensions of power. Turner and Guilding (2010b) note that the majority of management contract base fees are determined by gross revenue and then describe how this provides operators with an incentive to promote capital expenditure proposals that maximise revenue, without necessarily yielding a positive impact on profit. Further, an operator with a remuneration based on revenue has no incentive to initiate cost-saving hotel capital expenditure proposals. Operator base fees aligned with profit also promote a lack of capital expenditure goal congruency (see Turner & Guilding, 2010b) . Given the finding that owners with greater power exercise greater restraints with respect to the release of FF&E reserve funds, we anticipate that owners may be using their power advantage to control the way FF&E reserve funds are expended. Powerful owners, for example, would be well positioned to block funding for those projects that they see as providing an insufficient return on investment. Further research is called for to not only further examine this relationship, but also to more generally explore the ways in which FF&E reserve accounting can reflect and affect the particularities of a hotel owner/operator relationship.
With respect to the way that power has been measured in this study, it should be acknowledged that the context of the current study necessitated the measure being adapted from what was available in the literature. This signifies that the measurement of the variable that lies at the heart of this study does not carry the benefit of a history of prior application in research. It is also noteworthy that within each of the separate regression analyses run in connection with testing the three hypotheses, each dimension of power was found to be highly statistically significantly associated with the three dependent variables under examination. As a result, and despite the power literature advancing five distinct dimensions of power (French & Raven, 1959) , this study provides a justification, in future hotel management contracting studies, to measure power using a much more parsimonious holistic measure that would greatly reduce the number of items used to measure power in the current study. For future researchers specifically interested in this variable, a second alternative approach to measuring power that could be adopted would be to administer the questionnaire survey to a matched sample of owners and operators of hotels. This would enable a reliability check to be made of the data collected from each hotel site. Gaining access to a broad enough sample of matched owners and operators could prove difficult, however.
Further research concerned with hotel owner/operator power could examine the antecedents of power. Questionnaire based research that determines to what extent the locus of power is affected by factors such as the strength of an operators brand, the size of an owner, whether a hotel has an iconic location, etc., could usefully extend our understanding of the nature and significance of the locus of power variable. A further potentially interesting area of research that could build on the study reported herein could seek to determine the sensitivity of hotel management contract clauses to different distributions of power between hotel owners and operators. It could be, for example, where an owner is in a powerful negotiating position, there is a high likelihood that the FF&E reserve is notionally based and not cash based, as it appears owners prefer the additional flexibility of notional FF&E reserves (Turner & Guilding, 2010a) . It is notable, however, that Schlup (2004) claims that it is likely to be extremely difficult to weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of all hotel management contract clauses. Further possible research avenues could examine the owner / operator power balance in connection with important outcome variables such as performance, as well as operational facets, such as an owner's control of accounting and the manner in which a capital expenditure bank account is maintained. An examination could also be made of factors affecting the sufficiency of capital expenditure reserve accounts, as capital expenditure reserve account adequacy could be a key factor affecting a range of capital expenditure dynamics in hotels mediated by a management contract.
The relative novelty of this study signifies that it may carry significant forerunner qualities.
We anticipate that researchers interested in hotel management contracts will find this study to be a valuable platform from which to build further research. An ambitious, but potentially fruitful line of further research enquiry would be to replicate this study across a range of countries. If this were done, a potentially useful lens through which to examine observed differences would be Hofstede's (see 2001 Hofstede's (see , 2005 ) five dimensions of culture (i.e. power vs.
distance, individualism vs. collectivism, masculinity vs. femininity, uncertainty avoidance, and long vs. short term orientation). Should data be collected across several countries, a comparison of results using Hofstede's model may allow for a more in-depth understanding of the reasons behind any cross-country differences. Both hotel owners and operators would find such information useful if they were considering engaging in new overseas markets. It would appear the rapid growth of hotels in China could constitute a particularly rich domain of enquiry. Any reduction in barriers to entry would likely stimulate further investment into global hotel markets, which could serve to increase the overall size of the hotel industry on an international basis (Allison, 2004) . The frequency of budget-related discussions initiated by the subordinate's superior when budgets are being set?
--
Not used
The kind of reasoning provided to the subordinate by a superior when the budget is revised? -- I3.On the face of it, the proposal makes sound commercial sense. 5.19 1.49 101 a Prior to posing the questions, the questionnaire stated: 'In your hotel, to what extent do the following factors influence whether an investment proposal is given the go ahead?' All items were posed using a 7-point Likert scale: 1 = 'not at all'; 7 = 'to a large extent' The 'strategic factor', 'political factor' and 'intuitive factor' are each distinct orientations concerning non-financial approaches to investment appraisal. The 'financial factor' gauges the extent to which financial considerations influence whether a capital expenditure proposal is supported. Hinkin and Schriesheim (1989) My supervisor can make me feel personally accepted?
RF3: Which entity is in a stronger position to provide you with a sense of being personally accepted?
3.46 (1.31) n = 100 a Prior to posing the questions, the questionnaire stated "In terms of your hotel owner and your hotel operating company, which entity is in a stronger position to:". All items were measured on a Likert scale where 1 signifies high operator power and 7 signifies high owner power. a: Each cell reports the standardised regression coefficient followed by t-statistic in parentheses. For 'Power', one-tailed tests of statistical significance were employed. For the control variables of hotel size and hotel owner size, two-tailed tests of statistical significance were employed. b: Due to some missing values for the dependent variable, the variable inflation factors (VIFs) exhibit a small degree of variation across the five regression equations formulated. The observed range of VIFs are reported. * p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
